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Editorial abstract 
In this overview, Author presents the development of his approach—the two-
factor account of delusions—drawing attention to the neuropsychological re-
search on delusions (the role of brain damage in the formation of delusions), 
as well as to the differences between explaining monothematic and polythe-
matic delusions (this differentiation is not analyzed in detail in the present 
volume). He also sketches the most promising issues in the current research 
on delusions. 
Keywords: delusions; belief formation; brain damage; cognition; neuropsy-
chology. 
After “Access to the internal lexicon” 
What has changed in the Author’s approach in cognitive neuropsychology  
and cognitive neuropsychiatry since “Access to the internal lexicon”  
and “Lexical access in simple reading tasks”?6 
In the 1970s I was a cognitive psychologist doing theoretical work on the cog-
nitive mechanisms of skilled reading, and the two papers mentioned above 
are early examples of my work on this topic; they have had some influence, 
having been cited 1580 and 1333 times to date (Google Scholar, 29 March 
2015). However, in the late 1970s I became convinced, mostly because of the 
work of John Marshall and Tim Shallice, that progress in understanding the 
cognitive mechanisms of skilled reading could best be made by detailed study 
                                                             
5 "Delusional belief"—see Coltheart, M., Langdon, R. & McKay, R.T. 2011. Delusional belief. Annual 
Review of Psychology, 62: 271-298. 
6 Coltheart, M., Davelaar, E., Jonasson, J.T., and Besner, D. 1977. Access to the internal lexicon. In 
Dornic, S., ed. Attention and Performance VI. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Coltheart, M. 1978. Lexical access in simple reading tasks. In Underwood, G., ed. Strategies of 
Information Processing. London: Academic Press. 
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of the variety of ways in which reading breaks down in people who were for-
merly skilled readers but whose reading was then impaired by brain dam-
age—people suffering from acquired dyslexia. So I began to do research with 
such people. 
Studying people with specific impairments of cognition in an effort to learn 
more about the normal processes of cognition is a branch of cognitive psy-
chology known as cognitive neuropsychology. So I, and others like Marshall 
and Shallice, was working on the cognitive neuropsychology of reading, using 
the characteristic approach of cognitive neuropsychology, which is to study 
individual patients in great depth (that is, to do single-case studies, not group 
studies) and to focus on relating data from such patients to some explicit in-
formation-processing model of the relevant domain of cognition. The joint 
aims of such work are to use the patient data to test predictions of the model 
and to use the model for seeking to understand how the patient’s specific cog-
nitive symptoms arise. 
It was clear by the early 1980s that this was proving to be a very successful 
way of studying the cognitive psychology of reading. So cognitive psycholo-
gists interested in domains of cognition other than reading began to explore 
the possibility that they could learn valuable things about how processing 
normally proceeded in whatever domain of cognition they were interested in 
by studying people in whom brain damage had produced impairments in that 
particular domain. In this way cognitive neuropsychology, which had begun 
by studying the domain of reading, spread to many other cognitive domains 
such as spelling, spoken language comprehension and production, visual ob-
ject recognition, face processing, short-term memory and many others. The 
insights that were achieved into normal processes of cognition by studying 
individuals whose cognitive processes were damaged were substantial 
enough that the subject of cognitive neuropsychology needed its own journal; 
this journal, Cognitive Neuropsychology, was founded in 2004. 
In this early work, although a variety of different domains of cognitive (such 
as those listed above) were studied using the basic approach of cognitive neu-
ropsychology, all of these domains were what one might call low-level cogni-
tive domains. This was because in such domains cognitive psychology already 
offered explicit information-processing models of normal cognitive processes 
that could be directly tested by, and could offer plausible explanations for, the 
symptoms exhibited by patients with cognitive impairments consequent upon 
brain damage. But there are higher-level domains of cognition such as theory 
of mind, reasoning, belief formation and sense of agency that can also be im-
paired in clinical patients. Might it be possible to study even these by the 
methods of cognitive neuropsychology? 
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One major obstacle to doing this was that there were few models of normal 
processing in these higher cognitive domains, and even those models that did 
exist were far vaguer and less explicit than the models of reading, face recog-
nition, short-term memory et cetera that cognitive psychology had been de-
veloping for decades before the rise of cognitive neuropsychology. But this did 
not deter John Marshall, Hadyn Ellis and Andy Young from beginning, in the 
early 1990s, the cognitive-neuropsychological investigation of patients with 
such higher-level disorders, in the hope that this might allow the development 
of better models of higher-order domains of cognition. Patients with disorders 
of these domains are typically psychiatric patients. That is why the branch of 
cognitive neuropsychology that applies to these higher-order domains came to 
be called cognitive neuropsychiatry. Soon it too needed its own journal; and 
Cognitive Neuropsychiatry was founded in 1996. 
Just as acquired dyslexia was the most commonly studied form of cognitive 
impairment in the early days of cognitive neuropsychology, so delusional be-
lief was the most commonly studied form of cognitive impairment in the early 
days of cognitive neuropsychiatry. And just as the cognitive-neuropsycho-
logical approach then rapidly spread from reading to other low-level domains 
of cognition, so the cognitive-neuropsychiatric approach rapidly spread from 
delusional belief to other high-level domains of cognition: for example, in 
2014 the first two issues of the journal Cognitive Neuropsychiatry included 
papers on borderline personality disorder, anorexia nervosa, abnormalities of 
theory of mind, confabulation, Asperger’s syndrome and autism, as well of 
course as papers on delusional belief. 
I became a cognitive neuropsychiatrist by chance. My current long-term col-
league and collaborator Robyn Langdon, having been trained as a cognitive 
neuropsychologist, was interested in using the cognitive-neuropsychological 
approach to study impairments of theory of mind in patients with schizo-
phrenia. This was the subject of her PhD research in the 1990s. Her intended 
supervisor, an expert on schizophrenia, took a position in another university. 
So Robyn asked me to be her supervisor. When I protested that I knew noth-
ing about schizophrenia, she said that this did not matter since she did, and 
could teach me what I needed to know. That is how I fell into the field of cog-
nitive neuropsychiatry. 
I fell into work on delusional belief equally fortuitously. Also in the 1990s, a 
clinical neuropsychologist whom I knew, Nora Breen, had come across in her 
practice two men with the same, remarkable, delusion. Both men (who were 
in the early stages of dementia, though this was not known at the time) firmly 
believed that when they were looking into a mirror, they were not seeing 
themselves, but some stranger who looked like them. Nora decided that she 
wanted to do doctoral research on this form of delusion, known as mirrored-
self misidentification, and that I should be her supervisor. Despite never hav-
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ing studied delusional belief before, I found the videotapes of these patients 
that she showed me so fascinating that I agreed. I have been working on delu-
sional belief ever since. 
The sources and importance of two-factor theory of delusions.  
Problems with monothematic delusions 
William James was, I believe, the first person to express the insight that is the 
foundation for our two-factor theory of delusional belief (see Coltheart et al., 
2011, for our most recent exposition of this theory). In 1890, James wrote “The 
delusions of the insane are apt to affect certain typical forms, very difficult to 
explain. But in many cases they are certainly theories which the patients in-
vent to account for their bodily sensations” (James 1890/1950, chap. XIX). 
More recently, exactly the same idea was proposed by Brendan Maher. His 
view was that, when a patient is suffering from some sort of perceptual or 
affective impairment which leads the patient to have certain strange experi-
ences  
strange [experiences] felt to be significant demand explanation. It is the core 
of the present hypothesis that the explanations (i.e. the delusions) of the pa-
tient are derived by cognitive activity that is essentially indistinguishable 
from that employed by non-patients, by scientists, and by people generally 
(Maher 1974: 103). 
The James-Maher theory of delusional belief is a one-factor theory. All that is 
required for the genesis of delusion is the presence of a perceptual or affective 
impairment that leads the patient to have certain strange experiences. Nor-
mal—intact—processes of reasoning do the rest of the job in generating delu-
sional belief. 
In order to flesh out this theory, more needed to be said about the nature of 
the abnormal experiences that delusional patients have. What specific experi-
ences lead to what specific delusional beliefs, and why? What particular kind 
of abnormal experience could cause a patient to have a delusional belief with 
content X rather than with content Y? Thanks to the seminal work of Ellis et 
al. (1997), we can now see how to answer such questions. 
The particular delusion studied by Ellis and colleagues was the Capgras delu-
sion. This is the belief that someone emotionally close to the deluded person—
typically a spouse or other family member—has been replaced by a total 
stranger who looks just like the “missing” family member. To discover what is 
happening here, Ellis and colleagues exploited the fact that when anyone is 
looking at another person’s face, that face produces a much larger response of 
the viewer’s autonomic nervous system if the viewed face is familiar than 
when it is not. Ellis and colleagues reported that this was true even for non-
delusional psychiatric patients. But it was not true for sufferers from Capgras 
delusion, who showed very little autonomic responsivity at all to faces, and no 
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greater responsivity when the faces were familiar to them than when the fac-
es were entirely familiar. 
This absence of autonomic response to a face that looks just like the face of 
someone who ought to generate a large autonomic response is to do with what 
William James would have thought of as a bodily sensation (though here 
what’s unusual is the absence of an expected bodily sensation). So here he 
(and Maher) would expect the patient to invent a theory to account for this 
(lack of) specific bodily sensation. What could explain why a person you are 
seeing, who looks just like your wife, nevertheless does not generate in you a 
large autonomic response? Strangers do not generate large autonomic re-
sponses. So the theory that the person you are looking at is a stranger would 
account for your unusual experience. Here there is a highly plausible link 
between the specific kind of abnormal experience the patient is having and 
the specific content of the patient’s delusional belief. 
According to the James-Maher one-factor theory of delusional belief, this lack 
of autonomic responsivity to familiar faces is the only abnormality needed to 
cause the Capgras delusion. Normal processes of reasoning, used to try to ex-
plain this lack of response, do the rest of the job in generating the delusional 
Capgras belief. From this it follows that all patients who show no autonomic 
responsivity should also show Capgras delusion. 
But this turns out not to be so. Tranel et al. (1995) studied five patients with 
damage to the ventromedial cortex of the frontal lobes (a region also know as 
orbitofrontal cortex). In all of these patients, their brain damage had resulted 
in the failure of their autonomic nervous systems to respond to familiar faces. 
However, they were not delusional; they were able to correctly recognize peo-
ple highly familiar to them such as family members. 
What are we to make of this? It might be concluded that the failure of auto-
nomic responsivity to familiar faces seen in people with Capgras delusion is 
just a coincidence, something that has no causal role in the occurrence of the 
delusion. But this seems implausible because of the rather natural connection 
between the content of the Capgras delusion and the patient’s lack of the au-
tonomic response to seeing the face of the spouse, a response that the patient 
would have expected. So instead my collaborators and I have argued that in 
people who lack such autonomic responsivity, a second factor must be present 
if Capgras delusion is to occur.  
We think of this second factor as an abnormality of a belief evaluation system 
that is normally used to evaluate candidates for belief and to decide whether 
to dismiss these or adopt them as new beliefs. This abnormality is not present 
in the Tranel patients, so they are able correctly to reject the candidate belief 
“That is not my spouse” that is suggested to them by the failure of any auto-
nomic response the sight of the spouse’s face. In Capgras patients the effect of 
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the second factor (an impairment of the belief evaluation system) is to prevent 
this candidate belief from being rejected, which permits it instead to be 
adopted as a new belief. 
This two-factor theory of delusional belief is not just a theory about Capgras 
delusion; we have applied this approach to the explanation of a variety of oth-
er delusions too, such as the mirrored-self misidentification described above, 
the Cotard delusion (the belief that one is dead), the Fregoli delusion (the be-
lief that people one knows are following one around, but are not recognizable 
because they are in disguise) and various other delusions: see Coltheart et al. 
(2011) for an account of our explanations of a variety of delusional conditions. 
The general form of the two-factor theory of delusional belief is as follows. 
Just as James and Maher proposed, there is an abnormality that leads the pa-
tient to have an unexpected response to the environment that the patient 
seeks to explain. The explanation that the patient formulates is a candidate 
belief about the environment. The specific nature of this first factor is respon-
sible for the content of this candidate belief. Since the way in which the vari-
ous types of delusional belief differ is with respect to the content of the belief, 
the nature of the first factor differs from delusion to delusion. 
By definition, a belief only counts as delusional if there is strong evidence 
against it, evidence that should be accepted by the deluded person but is not. 
It is the second factor—an impairment of the belief evaluation process—
which is responsible for the candidate belief being adopted as a (delusional) 
belief rather than being rejected. The nature of this second factor is, we argue, 
common to all forms of delusional condition. 
As stated above, there are patients in whom the first factor of Capgras delu-
sion is present but who are not delusional; that is why we hold that a second 
factor is necessary for a delusion to arise (and why the two factors are of 
equal importance). A general task for the two-factor theory of delusion, then, 
is to identify for each delusion a plausible first factor (an impairment that has 
a plausible connection to the characteristic content of the delusion) and then 
for each proposed first factor to show that the literature contains reports of 
patients who suffer from the particular proposed impairment but who are not 
delusional. Any successful exercise of this kind justifies the claim, for the par-
ticular delusion concerned, that two factors are needed to explain the occur-
rence of the delusion.  
Coltheart et al. (2011) have proposed first factors for a number of different 
delusions and provided evidence that patients have been reported who exhib-
ited one or other of these first factors without being delusional. These demon-
strations constitute strong evidence in favor of the two-factor theory of delu-
sional belief and are very difficult to reconcile with any one-factor theory 
of delusion. 
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That is not to claim that the two-factor theory of delusional belief is not with-
out problem. These problems are discussed by Coltheart (2007) and Coltheart 
et al. (2011). They include: 
(a) What is the intended scope of the two-factor account of delusional belief? 
All of the forms of delusional belief I discuss in this paper are examples of 
monothematic delusional conditions: the patient has only a single delusional 
belief, or a small set of beliefs which are all about a single theme. And it is also 
clear that these kinds of delusion have neuropsychological bases. But some 
patients exhibit a polythematic delusional condition: they have many different 
and unrelated delusional beliefs. And with such patients there may be no 
clear evidence of neuropsychological dysfunction. Is the two-factor theory 
also meant to account for this kind of delusional condition? 
(b) Even when a delusional condition is monothematic and clearly consequent 
upon neuropsychological function, the delusional belief can come and go. 
Sometimes the patient expresses the belief, but at other times rejects it. How 
can this be so if the delusion is caused by neuropsychological damage? 
(c) If patients with monothematic delusions have impaired functioning of 
their belief evaluation systems, why don’t they have a whole variety of delu-
sional beliefs, rather than only one? 
Ways in which the two-factor theory can answer these questions are discussed 
in detail by Coltheart (2007) and Coltheart et al. (2011). 
From delusions to belief formation. The role of research on delusions  
in understanding non-pathological beliefs 
By definition, if you are doing cognitive-neuropsychiatric work on how delu-
sional beliefs are formed, you need a theory, no matter how sketchy, of the 
normal processes of belief formation. When Robyn Langdon, Nora Breen and 
I, together with the philosopher Martin Davies, began to develop the two-
factor theory of delusions in the late 1990s (see e.g. Davies et al. 2002), we in-
tended this theory to say something, even if not very much, about the normal 
processes of belief formation. 
Our general idea is that what generates candidates for belief are prediction 
errors. By this I mean that as people go about their everyday lives, they con-
tinually use their systems of belief to make predictions about what will hap-
pen to them next. In people with intact belief systems these predictions will 
almost always be correct, and whenever this happens this will go unnoticed 
and will have no consequences for the belief system. 
Occasionally, however, such predictions fail; something happens which is un-
expected. Any such error of prediction is a sign that the belief system needs to 
be revised, since there is some feature of the world, the feature which caused 
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the unexpected event, that is not correctly represented in the belief system. 
The prediction error triggers a search for hypotheses about what this feature 
might be: what could the world be like such that, if it were like that, the unex-
pected event would actually be expected? The process by which such hypothe-
ses are inferred is not deductive or inductive inference, but abductive infer-
ence, sometimes referred to as “inference to the best explanation” (Lipton 
1991). As a rule abductive inference will yield many possible explanations for 
the unexpected event, and so there needs to be a belief evaluation process 
here—that is, a choice must be made, perhaps along Bayesian lines, concern-
ing which hypothesis to accept. Accepting a hypothesis means adopting 
a new belief. 
Here, then we have the following picture of the normal processes of belief 
generation, evaluation and adoption. Prediction error leads to the generation 
of a number of candidate beliefs about the world, each being a possible expla-
nation of the unexpected event. A belief evaluation process is then applied to 
this set of candidate beliefs, and the winning candidate is adopted as 
a new belief. 
All of this also happens in cases of pathological belief i.e. delusion. In the case 
of Capgras delusion, the patient sees a person with his wife’s face and predicts 
that there will be an autonomic response, but there is no such response: 
there’s the prediction error, caused by the first factor. One possible explana-
tion for this error that could be yielded by abductive inference is that this is 
not the wife. If this were true, then the unexpected event would be expected, 
so this is an abductively adequate explanation. The belief evaluation process 
should reject this candidate belief because there is so much evidence against 
it; but because of the presence of the second factor (some form of defect in the 
belief evaluation process), this belief is instead adopted i.e. the person be-
comes delusional. 
Thus the two-factor explanation for delusional belief does have embodied in it 
a clear, if rudimentary, theory about the non-pathological processes of normal 
belief formation. 
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New routes, emerging fields... On expectations and hopes  
for the future research on delusions 
Several important routes for future research are evident. I will mention 
just two. 
First is further elaboration of the theory of normal belief formation that is 
suggested by the two-factor theory of delusional belief. The most promising 
avenue here is to seek to link up the theory of delusional belief with the dual-
process framework offered by Kahneman (2011). This framework posits two 
systems of thought. System 1 is fast, automatic and unconscious. System 2 is 
slow, effortful, systematic and conscious. Most of our thought is System 1 
thought. One thing that brings System 2 into play is System 1 being confronted 
with a problem that it finds difficult or impossible to resolve.  
Kahneman amasses a great deal of evidence from studies of thinking and rea-
soning in intact people that supports this dual-process framework. It seems 
likely that the two-factor theory of delusional belief can also be shown to be 
consistent with this framework. System 1 would seem to correspond to the 
processes we use—constantly, rapidly and automatically—to predict what will 
happen to us next. A prediction error (caused by the first factor) corresponds 
to a failure of System 1 processes, which leads to an invocation of System 2. 
System 2 in the intact mind is responsible for belief evaluation and adoption 
processes, and Factor 2 is an abnormality of these processes. In expositions of 
the two-factor theory, the nature of this abnormality is only described in the 
most general of terms. Future work on the two-factor theory will have to de-
scribe Factor 2 in much more specific terms, and attempting to link the two-
factor theory to Kahneman’s dual-process framework might achieve this. 
A second important avenue for future research here concerns the neuropsy-
chology of delusional belief. Can the abnormalities referred to as Factor 1 and 
Factor 2 in the two-factor theory be identified as specific neuropsychological 
impairments? To show that this is so, then two things would need to be 
demonstrated in patients with delusional beliefs.  
First, for each different delusion a neuropsychological impairment would 
have to be demonstrated that would produce an effect corresponding to that 
delusion’s Factor 1 (e.g. in cases of Capgras delusion, the neuropsychological 
impairment would have to have the effect of preventing familiar faces from 
evoking autonomic responses). Since the two-factor theory asserts that each 
type of delusion has its own type of Factor 1, what the neuropsychology would 
have to demonstrate is a different form of neuropsychological impairment for 
each different type of delusion. Quite a lot of progress has been made in iden-
tifying what form of neuropsychological impairment corresponds to Factor 1 
in different forms of delusion (Coltheart 2007, 2010). 
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Second, a neuropsychological impairment would have to be demonstrated 
that would produce an effect corresponding to Factor 2. Since the two-factor 
theory asserts that every type of delusion has the same Factor 2, this makes 
the bold prediction that there will be some form of damage to the brain that 
will be common to all forms of delusion, regardless of the content of that delu-
sion. This would be damage to a region of the brain that is the neural sub-
strate for the cognitive system involved in belief evaluation. What might this 
region be? Coltheart (2007) reviewed some scraps of literature that suggest 
that this region might be located in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(rDLPFC). Since then further evidence has emerged suggesting that this brain 
region is indeed damaged in cases of delusion (e.g. Villarejo et al. 2011). 
This suggests a specific focus for future neuroimaging work with delusional 
patients: is it really true that rDLPFC is consistently impaired in such patients? 
If this does turn out to be so, what about the suggestion that rDLPFC is the 
neural substrate for the cognitive system involved in belief evaluation? That 
can be directly investigated by neuroimaging studies of cognitively intact peo-
ple carrying out tasks that require belief evaluation. Does one see evidence of 
rDLPFC activation here? 
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